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1. Introduction  
A lengthy preferential trade agreement (PTA) signed in 2008 contains annexes to its 
government procurement chapter that list the goods, services, and entities in Canada and 
Colombia that are covered by the agreement’s procurement rules. The sections that contain the 
“Schedule of Colombia” are unremarkable, except that the agreement in question is actually 
between Canada and Peru! Canada was indeed negotiating PTAs with both Peru and Colombia at 
the same time, and would sign the two agreements a week apart. This odd insertion of language 
about Colombia in a Canadian agreement with Peru certainly appears to be the result of sloppy 
copy-and-pasting between treaties.  
This anecdote goes against most of what we know from literatures on bargaining, 
diplomacy, and international negotiation – all of which suggest that widespread copy-pasting of 
treaty texts is unlikely. But to some the above mistake may be unsurprising, since legal scholars 
frequently note the propensity for contracts to be drawn from standard or “boilerplate” language. 
Likewise, scholarship from international relations and international law increasingly alleges that 
new treaties are produced from models and that emulation is common. Empirical evidence of 
wholesale copy-pasting of treaty text is scant, however. Thus the primary question we explore in 
this research note is whether significant portions of important international treaties are copied-
and-pasted from one agreement to the next?        
To answer this question, we systematically compare the texts of several hundred 
agreements that address a common issue, in our case trade liberalization. Utilizing a novel and 
appropriate type of text analysis, our analyses reveal that most PTAs copy verbatim a sizeable 
majority of their content from an existing agreement. In fact, at least 100 PTAs take 80% or 
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more of their contents word-for-word from an earlier treaty, with many copying 95% or more. 
Copy-pasting is even more pronounced when we compare the main substantive provisions of 
trade agreements – such as chapters on antidumping, services, or intellectual property – where 
we regularly find chapters that are copied in their entirety from a pre-existing treaty. These 
findings are highly robust to different methods of comparison and the copy-paste percentages are 
somewhat conservative. Additionally, we reveal that copy-pasting is most prevalent in two 
distinct scenarios:  low-capacity governments that turn to an existing template to help devise 
their agreements, and powerful states that desire to spread their preferred set of rules globally.  
Our study represents a new approach to studying international agreements – one which 
leverages text analysis in a meaningful way and has several important implications. First and 
foremost, our findings re-shape how we think about processes of international cooperation. 
Governments do not painstakingly craft their agreements line-by-line, but instead lift large 
amounts of text from elsewhere as a shortcut. They may clash over whose past template to use, 
but this is a fundamentally different process, with different implications, than the classical, 
idealized version of negotiations. Additionally, copy-pasting from past agreements can have 
important, sometimes negative, consequences. Taking language “off the shelf” may lower the 
cost of international agreement-making for small or low-capacity countries, but it also leads to 
the replication and spread of treaty language that was devised by powerful states to suit their own 
agendas. Furthermore, what is viewed as “boilerplate” language (Gulati and Scott 2012) can 
have unforeseen consequences (Radin 2013), such as when governments that included seemingly 
mundane investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) language in their investment agreements later 
were subject to billion-dollar arbitration actions (Poulsen 2015). A final implication of 
widespread copy-pasting is that various de-centralized treaty regimes, such as those for trade and 
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investment, may be less fragmented than often assumed (Drezner 2009). This is because of the 
continued replication, and even convergence, of treaty language. 
In sum, this research presents compelling evidence about how prominent global 
agreements are produced primarily through copy-pasting. This recasts our understanding of how 
international agreements arise and how they vary, and should spark additional research on the 
ways in which copy-paste dynamics affect international cooperation.   
 
2. Evolving Perspectives on International Treaty-Making  
Most of what we know from existing scholarship in international relations would seem to 
cast doubt on the idea of widespread copy-pasting of treaty texts. Diplomatic interactions involve 
different actors (political leadership, bureaucrats, foreign diplomats, global civil servants) in 
different venues (bilateral, multilateral, conferences, summits, and ad hoc negotiations) – all of 
which suggests agreement heterogeneity (Cooper, Heine and Thakur 2013, parts II and III). 
Negotiation inputs ranging from structural features such as bargaining power to the individual 
styles and skills of negotiators also should lead to further variation in negotiated outcomes (e.g., 
Berton, Kimura, and Zartman 1999; Starkey, Boyer, and Wilkenfeld 2005). The duration of 
negotiations also varies, and can affect the length, content, and complexity of a resulting 
agreement. Likewise, there exist many game-theoretic portrayals of international bargaining, 
often within the context of international institutions (see Gilligan and Johns 2012), in which 
governments exchange offers in an attempt to reach a mutually-acceptable solution within some 
policy space (e.g., Fearon 1995). Each instance of cooperative bargaining – even when 
addressing the same substantive issue (i.e., trade) – should produce unique outcomes because the 
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actors differ in number or by “type,” and face varying levels of incomplete information or 
domestic political constraints.   
But we see room for compatibility between the above portrayals and possible copy-
pasting dynamics. Bargaining offers could be based on templates, for instance. Also, different 
negotiation inputs might map onto a more finite set of possible treaty outcomes. In this research 
note, we identify and advance an emerging account of international agreement-making in which 
copy-pasting is more systematic than anyone realizes. Our starting point is legal scholarship on 
contracting as well as nascent scholarship in international relations on emulation and treaty 
models. These literatures acknowledge that agreements are not entirely homogenous, but expect 
less variation and more consistency across agreement terms due to a heavy reliance on models, 
templates, and recycled language.  
 The body of scholarship that most directly informs this perspective is the legal literature 
on contracting. Standard-form contracts, which can be thought of as a template, are widely used 
in domestic law. Across a variety of settings, the actors that write up any type of legal document 
will rely heavily on standard or boilerplate language from an existing document (e.g., Ben-Sharar 
and White 2006; Gulati and Scott 2012; Kahan and Klausner 1997; Radin 2013). Within the 
contracting literature, then, the use of templates is a fact of life – a seemingly ubiquitous practice 
for the drawing up of complex legal documents. One potential advantage is efficiency (since 
language can be taken “off the shelf” instead of being created from scratch) and perhaps also 
predictability.1 Boilerplate language also can become a focal point that is used when parties 
disagree on elements of a contract.   
                                                 
1 The primary risk with relying on boilerplate language is that users may not be fully aware of what they are 
specifying or its myriad future consequences (Radin 2013).  
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 Gulati and Scott’s (2012) study of the prevalence of so-called “boilerplating” in 
sovereign debt contracts is a particularly relevant application. They interview hundreds of 
lawyers at firms that write sovereign debt contracts and find that new contracts are produced in 
minutes from boilerplate ones – even when there are compelling reasons to modify or tailor 
contracts more carefully. They offer several possible reasons for the prevalence of boilerplating, 
including but not limited to:  satisficing, other cognitive biases and limitations, risk aversion, 
organizational routine, free riding, and complexity. One can see how many of these ideas could 
apply to international negotiations, with negotiators being asked to negotiate multiple treaties at 
once, a foreign ministry following standard operating procedures, or underfunded bureaucracies 
reaching for existing treaty models.   
Within the realm of international politics, those who study bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) increasingly acknowledge the presence of models and the possible use of templates. 
Many governments now devise their own “model BIT” (Brown 2013; Dolzer and Schreuer 2012; 
UNCTAD 2015), with the idea that it will be used as the basis for future negotiations with 
partners.2 Qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence confirms that much of the text from a 
country’s model can be found in the actual treaties they negotiate with a partner (Allee and Lugg 
2016b; Brown 2013). Governments also may rely on past treaties or others’ models (Alschner 
and Skougarevskiy 2016; Poulsen 2015), which can have negative or even disastrous 
consequences. Poulsen’s (2015) compelling account of the negative effects of BITs on 
developing countries, in fact, is based on the premise that developing countries are copying the 
treaty models of Western countries, despite more applicable models and incentives to do 
otherwise (see Ofodile 2013).  
                                                 
2 The practice dates back nearly three decades to the first U.S. model BIT (Vandevelde 1992), although dozens of 
countries now produce their own models (see Brown 2013). 
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 Recent scholarship on PTAs, defined broadly to include regional organizations, 
emphasizes that some international institutions serves as models for others. Multiple studies 
focus on how E.U. institutions serve as a models for other regional agreements (e.g., Alter 2012; 
Börzel and Risse 2012; Jetschke and Lenz 2013; Jetschke and Murray 2012; Lenz 2012). 
Likewise, Arnold and Rittberger (2013) argue that the design of the Mercosur’s dispute 
settlement system was inspired by both the World Trade Organization’s legal system and the 
European Court of Justice and Rühl (2012) similarly shows that the dispute settlement 
mechanisms (DSMs) of the WTO and NAFTA have served as models for other DSMs. Some 
have identified other possible templates in PTAs (Estevadeordal et al. 2009), whether for certain 
issue areas or regions (Elsig and Serrano 2014; Fink and Molinuevo 2008). Also applicable is 
recent work by Baccini, Dür and Haftel (2015), in which they use cluster analysis on multiple 
variables to identify the consistent presence of three post-war PTAs types or “models” (an E.U. 
model, a U.S./NAFTA model, and a “Southern” model) across the universe of post-war PTAs.   
 The above studies provide a solid foundation for our expectation of widespread copy-
pasting of international treaties. We advance this perspective in two ways. Our first and primary 
contribution is empirical. Existing evidence for the use of models and templates in international 
negotiations tends to be confined to single cases or limited settings. That agreements are copied 
from past models is often more of an assumption than something that is demonstrated 
empirically. Thus our primary motivation in this research is to examine, and show as clearly as 
possible, the extent to which international treaty-making is characterized by copy-pasting.  
A second contribution is theoretical. In the process of exploring empirical patterns of 
copy-pasting, we put forward and explore some of the reasons why such replication might occur. 
We believe that international negotiations should function like other settings in which complex 
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contracts are written. Governments are unlikely to negotiate from scratch; doing so is both 
cumbersome and unnecessary. All sides enter into negotiations with a clear sense of what they 
want included in a new agreement, which is likely to have been formulated previously in some 
type of draft treaty or past agreement. These existing documents already contain precise 
language and formulations that have been well-vetted. Thus, as it is for those who write 
sovereign debt contracts, it is easier to work off an existing document than to write an entirely 
new one. Even if parties disagree on the appropriate language, it still is easier to work from – and 
modify – a fully formulated document(s) than to start from scratch.  
We therefore offer a few conjectures for when we expect large-scale copy-pasting of past 
language to occur. First, we expect powerful states to be more likely to copy-paste heavily – and 
to do so from their own past agreements. Such actors have a more clearly-formulated vision of 
what they want in an agreement, a greater likelihood of having a past agreement or explicit 
template to draw from, and the bargaining leverage to get what they want. Relatedly, we 
generally expect actors to copy-paste from their own previous documents whenever possible, 
since they are more accessible and more likely to reflect their preferences. Second, we expect 
inexperienced and/or low-resource governments to utilize an existing template as a way to 
address their lack of knowledge or limited diplomatic capacity. They may recycle language from 
their own past agreements, if available, or emulate language devised by others – particularly if 
those others are similar geographically, economically, or culturally (e.g., Elkins, Guzman and 
Simmons 2006). Finally, we expect copy-pasting to increase over time, as certain templates 
become popular and are replicated regularly.  
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3. Empirical Tests  
Our analyses align, but are distinct from, other recent efforts to differentiate among the 
features of seemingly-similar international institutions. During the past fifteen years, scholars 
have put forward various institutional design arguments (e.g., Goldstein et al. 2000; Koremenos, 
Lipson and Snidal 2001) and applied them empirically to treaties (Koremenos 2013), regional 
organizations (Acharya and Johnston 2007; Haftel 2012), and international organizations 
generally (Tallberg et al. 2015). A wave of quantitative empirical studies has employed numeric 
indicators to code variation across different types of international agreements. PTAs have been 
coded most extensively, whether across multiple issues (Dür, Baccini and Elsig 2014) or subsets 
such as trade remedies (Kucik 2012), competition provisions (Bradford and Büthe 2015), non-
trade issues (Milewicz et al. 2014) and dispute settlement mechanisms (Jo and Namgung 2012, 
Smith 2000). Variation across BITs also is now being coded, particularly in terms of dispute 
settlement or overall treaty strength (Allee and Peinhardt 2010, 2014; Berger et al. 2010; 
Neumayer et al. 2014). Similar data collection efforts have been launched to capture variation 
across environmental treaties (Bernauer et al. 2013).  
We likewise acknowledge the heterogeneity of institutions like PTAs, yet our approach to 
comparing the contents of these agreements differs in a few key respects. First, we look for 
similarities as compared to just differences. A concern is that observable variation could be over-
emphasized at the expense of obvious areas of convergence. Second, we examine the entire 
contents of international agreements as compared to a particular section. More narrowly-focused 
studies and data collection efforts are incredibly valuable; sometimes, however, it is important to 
consider the entire forest and not just the trees. Third, we consider the text of treaties to be data 
itself, as compared to distilling it into one or more numeric variables. This provides a new 
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analytical vantage point, and is the most appropriate way to ascertain whether the contents of 
treaties are being replicated en masse.  
 
3.1 Methodology 
Political scientists increasingly use “text as data” methodologies to extract pieces of 
information from text documents for purposes of classification or scaling (e.g., Grimmer and 
Stewart 2013). Although less prominent in the study of international relations, we argue that 
certain text-analysis methods are quite valuable for studying purposeful written documents such 
as international treaties (see Allee and Lugg 2016a; Spirling 2012). We employ an approach 
similar to that used by those investigating plagiarism, in which we search for perfectly-matching 
strings of text that would indicate “copy-pasting” from some other document. The closest 
parallel to our empirical approach is a series of studies that compare the text of opinions written 
by U.S. Supreme Court justices to lower-court opinions and written briefs submitted by those 
interested in the case (e.g., Collins et.al. 2013; Corley et.al. 2011; Feldman 2015).   
We analyze the text of PTAs, which are a logical choice for many reasons. They are 
numerous, signed by nearly all countries (including all members of the World Trade 
Organization), and perhaps the most consequential of all international agreements. They are 
important politically, as evidenced by the emphasis on them in the current U.S. election 
campaign, and have been studied extensively by scholars, particularly those who emphasize 
institutional design. If anything, they present a demanding test for discovering copy-pasting 
because of their salience, the different attitudes and priorities that governments have toward 
them, and the fact that they often take years to negotiate. 
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We compare the complete texts, and relevant subsets, of 378 PTAs signed during the 
postwar period 1954-2013. We first prepare the texts in a few common-sense ways. We omit a 
limited number of agreements that involve a micro-states or non-sovereign territories, have 
limited scope (i.e., services only), or are merely supplemental protocols. To facilitate analysis, 
we convert the .pdf versions of the agreements to plain text format.3 We compare treaties in a 
common language (English), but emphasize that the overwhelming majority of treaties are 
concluded in English and many remaining ones are available in both English and another 
language.4  To avoid biasing results systematically, we eliminate the initial and concluding 
sentences of each document (which provide unique location, date, and other information) and 
eliminate any annexes (for the minority of agreements that have them), unless a particular annex 
contains substantive content that in other PTAs is included in the main text (articles and 
chapters).5 Finally, we compare each agreement only to those PTAs that were signed previously 
or contemporaneously, to reflect the available templates at the time.    
To identify identical text, we require that the text between two agreements matches: 1) 
literally word-for-word (with no deviations), and 2) for sequences of six or more words. 
Requiring that text be the exact same, and in the same order, signifies that it has been copy-
pasted from elsewhere instead of just inspired by or re-written from an earlier document.6  
Furthermore, requiring six words or more ensures that everyday words alone cannot constitute a 
                                                 
3 In about a dozen cases a treaty text was damaged and we could not repair it or identify an undamaged alternative.  
Other than being more likely to happen for much older treaties, we do not observe any patterns in terms of the PTAs 
in which this occurs. 
4 In two-language agreements there typically is a clause stating that the in case of divergence the English-language 
text will prevail.  
5 Annexes, when they exist, typically contain limited and somewhat esoteric language and data on rules of origin, 
tariff schedules, etc. Product descriptions in tariff schedules are harmonized, so including them would likely bias 
upward our conclusions about text overlap.  
6 In order to ensure accurate matching, we ignore numbers and Roman numerals (and accompanying punctuation) 
that are used in headings and lists, since these vary from treaty to treaty in idiosyncratic ways.  
12 
 
match,7 and is consistent with past research.8 We believe these core parameters constitute a 
relatively conservative approach toward estimating the amount of text that is copy-pasted, but 
emphasize that our finding remain robust when we specify more liberal or more restrictive rules 
(as we show in Table 2). To carry out our comparisons, we utilize Wcopyfind 4.1.4, a program 
written by Bloomfield (2014) that allows for large-scale comparisons of texts and allows us to 
specify the match parameters. To calculate the percentage of content in one treaty that is taken 
from another, we take the number of matching words (based on the two parameters above) and 
divide it by the total number of words in the agreement being analyzed.    
 
3.2 Findings  
Our analyses show quite powerfully that much of the language in PTAs is indeed copied 
directly from other treaties. Most PTAs take half or more of their contents verbatim from another 
single agreement. More than 100 of them copy 80% or more of the text from another source, and 
nearly 50 copy 90% or more of their contents word-for-word from another treaty. These results 
are highly robust and rise even further when we compare substantive chapters of the agreements 
to one another.   
                                                 
7 Most common phrases are shorter than six words and thus are not counted. However, even longer common phrases 
such as “This article is without prejudice to” would comprise only .006% (6/100,000) of a document containing 
100,000 words, a typical length for a PTA. 
8 Other social science applications also match on six words (e.g., Eshbaugh-Soha 2013; Corley, Collins, and Calvin 
2011).  
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For each of the 378 PTAs we analyze, we first identify the percentage of text that is taken 
verbatim from its closest match among existing PTAs. The results are striking. Figure 1 shows 
the distribution of maximum-match percentages for all of the treaties. Overall we find that the 
median treaty among our 378 takes a sizeable 56% of its text verbatim from its closest treaty 
match – not to mention any other heavily-overlapping treaties. Overall the distribution is tilted 
heavily toward the upper bound.9 Looking at Figure 1, the modal categorical outcome is for a 
PTA to take 80-84% of its text from a single source treaty.  Moreover, the three most common 
categorical options depicted in Figure 1 all entail a PTA drawing between 80-94% of its text 
from an existing source. 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, we observe that a significant number of PTAs that overlap relatively little with another treaty fall in 
the lowest overlap range (0-20%) instead of more moderate ranges (20-50%). Further inspection reveals a diverse 
subset of treaties that appear somewhat isolated in that they occur early in our time period, in years with relatively 
little activity, or among countries that sign no other PTAs. 
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 Figure 2 hones in on the upper quartile of the distribution in Figure 1, depicting the 
number of treaties that overlap at various percentage-levels between 75-99%. Taking in all of 
Figure 2, we see more than 120 PTAs copy three-quarters or more of their content word-for-
word from another agreement. At the higher end, 46 PTAs copy 90% or more of their language 
from another, single treaty – with five taking a staggering 99%. The modal value within Figure 2  
is for a PTA to copy 90% of its contents word-for-word from a “source” agreement.  
 
 
 These overlap numbers also are robust. Our primary method of comparison requires six 
or more consecutive words to be replicated perfectly to constitute a “match.” To check for 
robustness we re-estimate the comparisons after varying both parameters. First, we relax the 
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requirement that the match be “perfect” and instead allow for close but not verbatim matches.10 
Second, we vary the number of words needed to create a match, in both less (four) and more 
(eight, ten) restrictive directions. The results are shown in Table 1. One immediate take-away is 
that the finding of widespread copy-pasting is highly stable. Five of the seven re-estimations 
produce a 3% or less change in the average copy-paste percentage. Allowing for inexact 
matches, for instance, produces only a modest 2.5% increase in the average copy-paste 
percentage, ceteris paribus. Even at the extremes of varying both matching parameters, the 
average overlap percentage only varies (increases) by around 8%. The effects of modifying 
match parameters are modest overall, and the fact that more demanding requirements for 
matching are largely inconsequential increases our confidence in our original approach. 
Table 1:  Sensitivity Check for Alternate Text-Match Parameters 
 
 
Match Specifications Effect on Average Overlap Percentage  (baseline is 6 words, Exact match) 
4 words, Close match  +8.5% 
4 words, Exact match +5.8% 
6 words, Close match +2.5% 
8 words, Close match +.2% 
6 words, Exact match (baseline) --- 
10 words, Close match -.9% 
8 words, Exact match -2.3% 
10 words, Exact match -3.3% 
 
 
                                                 
10 To comprise a close match, 80% of the text in a segment (of any length) must match exactly, but up to five words 
in the segment may be distinct.   
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 These large and stable numbers are somewhat conservative for another reason. For our 
copy-paste percentages, we report the amount of text drawn from a single, existing treaty – the 
treaty with the greatest overlap with the PTA being analyzed. We do this for simplicity and 
consistency, and because available computational options are based on pairwise comparisons. 
Yet there often are additional treaties – the second-, third-, or even tenth-best matches – that also 
overlap significantly with the treaty in question. If we were able to cycle through each 
subsequent close match, we would generate a higher overall copy-paste percentage as we locate 
additional text in other treaties (not found in the closest treaty-match) that is utilized in the new 
treaty. Although this is not possible, for each PTA we can examine the next-closest treaty 
matches to see how much is copied from them.       
Figure 3 illustrates how much overlapping text is found in the second- and third-closest 
PTA matches, in addition to the closest match. In a few cases it is a clear that a single treaty is 
the dominant source of the copied language – with the next-closest match falling to the level of 
70% overlap or just below. Yet in the sizeable majority of cases there is relatively little “drop 
off,” with second- and even third-best matches overlapping to the tune of 80-90% or more. Thus, 
even if the closest-match did not exist, the subsequent PTA might still look a lot like various 
other PTAs. It is difficult to disentangle fully this web of reinforcing text overlap. Nevertheless, 
once one moves beyond the single largest source for a given PTA’s borrowed text, several other 
treaties likely “fill in” at least some of the remaining uniqueness. This adds further evidence to 
the conclusion that on average the vast majority of text in a PTA is copy-and-pasted verbatim 
from one or more pre-existing agreements.   
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 Next we investigate and compare the substantive chapters of PTAs to see how much they 
are copy-pasted from earlier chapters. We identify fifteen trade areas that are most commonly 
addressed in PTAs, all of which will be familiar to trade scholars.11 For each PTA that addresses 
a given trade issue, we isolate all of the text from the relevant chapter as well as any text 
elsewhere in the PTA that directly concerns the same topic. We then re-estimate our comparisons 
                                                 
11 The fifteen areas include: antidumping, dispute settlement, safeguards, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, 
intellectual property, technical barriers to trade, government procurement, services, investment, labor, financial 
services, e-commerce, telecommunications, movement, and the environment. 
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on the texts of each of the fifteen substantive trade topics, using the same specifications 
discussed earlier.  
Table 2:  Median and Maximum Amount of Text Shared with Closest Treaty Match 
by Trade Topic  
 
Part of PTA that is                    
being Compared 
Median 
Overlap Max Overlap 
n 
Complete Text 56% 99% 378 
   Antidumping  88% 100% 261 
   Procurement 86% 100% 194 
   Safeguards 80% 100% 327 
   Services 77% 100% 184 
   Labor 74% 99% 24 
   Intellectual Property 72% 100% 218 
   Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary 71% 100% 217 
   Financial Services 70% 100% 61 
   Technical Barriers  68% 100% 221 
   E-Commerce 67% 100%  45 
   Dispute Settlement 66% 100% 366 
   Investment 65% 100% 177 
   Telecommunications 64% 100% 64 
   Movement 50% 97% 82 
   Environment 50% 100% 56 
Average across all fifteen  
sub-issues 70% - 
378 
 
 
 
The findings summarized in Table 2 reveal that on average the substantive areas exhibit 
even stronger copy-and-paste dynamics as compared to the full treaty texts. For ten of the trade 
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areas the median PTA copies two-thirds or more of a given chapter directly from the chapter in 
another PTA. For three areas the median amount copied is 80% or more. If we sum across all 
fifteen areas, we see that on average 70% of the substantive content of a PTA is taken verbatim 
from another treaty. These elevated numbers make sense because these topics represent the core 
of the agreements. Perhaps most striking are the findings for maximum copy-paste values. 
Across 12 of the 15 trade topics we uncover one or more PTAs that copies an entire substantive 
chapter directly from a pre-existing agreement. The three other areas have at least one PTA that 
copies 97% or more of its chapter from another PTA.  
Table 2 also reveals that the most highly-evolved trade areas are those where copy-
pasting is greatest. This includes topics such as antidumping and safeguards, which have been 
addressed in trade agreements (WTO and early-generation PTAs) for decades. By contrast, we 
see less borrowing of text on newer trade topics such as the environment, movement, and 
telecommunications. These findings make sense: the more well-established trade topics appear in 
more PTAs and have more past chapters that can serve as templates, whereas templates are less 
developed on the newer issues. Also, over time certain templates for a given issue are likely to 
“win out” and become more heavily replicated. This, then, leads to greater convergence of treaty 
language in these areas.  
The above discussion raises the interesting issue of whether we are witnessing more or 
less convergence over time in terms of what is being specified in agreements such as PTAs. An 
increasing worry for many is that the shift from multilateral to regional or bilateral cooperation is 
leading to greater legal fragmentation (e.g., Benvenisti and Downs 2007). Concerns are 
particularly pronounced on trade policy given the shift from the WTO to PTAs (e.g., Bhagwati 
2007, Pauwelyn 2003). The primary worry is that increasing “regime complexity” (Alter and 
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Meunier 2009) can weaken legal obligations and make compliance with rules more difficult 
(Drezner 2009).   
 
We return to the full agreement texts to see if the language in PTAs overlaps more or less 
over time. Figure 4 reveals that on average PTAs signed in more recent years do indeed take 
more content from pre-existing agreements.12 The most noteworthy pattern in Figure 4 is the 
high-degree of copy-pasting of text that occurs in the post-Cold War period. In periods since 
1990, the average treaty has taken approximately 50-65% of its text from a pre-existing treaty, a 
pattern that remains relatively consistent. This far eclipses levels of earlier years (with a brief 
exception in the early 1970s) when there were fewer PTAs, fewer templates, and less borrowing 
of language. All in all, Figure 4 indicates that despite the proliferation of agreements, the legal 
                                                 
12 We present the totals by decade for three situations (1950s, 1960s, 1980s) in which there are a limited number of 
new PTAs signed in that period (ten or fewer).  
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rules within them appear to be converging instead of diverging, thus allaying fears that 
international regimes are becoming more fragmented.    
We now dig deeper into what exactly is being replicated from one treaty to the next. The 
online appendix includes several examples of copy-pasted text that reflect many of the dynamics 
we observe consistently. The first example highlights selections of shared text between the 1995 
Armenia-Turkmenistan PTA and the Armenia-Moldova trade agreement from two years earlier – 
which share 93% of the exact same text overall. This is one of many post-Soviet examples in our 
data. In this particular case, we see passages re-used word-for-word from one agreement to the 
next, with only minor differences in numbering, sentence structure, etc. Even small mistakes 
(extra spaces, missing words such as “the” or “an”) are replicated, providing further evidence 
that the actual transfer occurs via copy-pasting instead of re-drafting.  
Additional examples, such as the United States’ PTAs with Chile (2003) and later 
Colombia (2006), illustrate how templates are replicated from one treaty to the next with only 
minor modifications. The Colombia agreement (on the left) copies the same language that was 
used previously (Chile agreement, on the right) – occasionally adding minor tweaks in terms of 
proper nouns, simple language, etc. The different article numbers across the two PTAs indicate 
that agreements can be structured differently and be interrupted by unique content – but many 
core sections of the agreement are simply replicated whenever the appropriate time comes. The 
replicated content can be specific to one of the actors – such as the replicated sections on 
distinctive products such as U.S. bourbon whiskey – which illustrates that unique content, not 
generic legal language, is often copied. The same is true in the E.U. stabilization and association 
agreements with both Albania and then Montenegro, which overall share more than three-
quarters of the exact same language. The example in the appendix highlights the presence of 
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identical, E.U-driven provisions related to combatting terrorism and treatment of other 
signatories of similar agreements.  Finally, we see the potential for updating of templates and 
reproducing new contents. For instance, language on a sugar compensation mechanism, which 
was not in the U.S.-Chile agreement, was inserted into the PTA with Peru and then copied word-
for-word in the subsequent U.S. agreement with Panama.  
The examples in the appendix also begin to paint the picture of where copy-pasting is 
most prevalent. In order to get a better sense of when, and by whom, copying-and-pasting is 
most likely to occur, we now identify the actual PTAs that borrow the most text from elsewhere. 
Table 3 lists the 30 PTAs that take the greatest percentage of their text from an earlier PTA. One 
thing that jumps out is the sizeable number of countries from central and eastern Europe. 
Thirteen of the first 15 PTAs in Table 3 include a country from the region, such as Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, the Czech Republic, and all three Baltic states, among others. 
Earlier we put forward the argument that low-capacity or inexperienced countries might find it 
desirable to copy from an existing treaty as an efficiency shortcut. This certainly appears to be 
the case, based on the time periods in which these countries are doing the copying. Most of these 
agreements are signed in an era of political and economic transition immediately after the end of 
the Cold War.13 This suggests that countries that have little experience with agreement-making 
are more likely to use templates.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 This is the 1990s for most and 2000s for others (i.e., Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
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Table 3:  PTAs with the Most Text Taken from Another Treaty 
 
PTA Year % Text Taken Verbatim   From Most Similar Treaty 
Israel-Slovakia 1996 99 
United States-Peru 2006 99 
Czech Republic-Israel 1996 99 
Albania-Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003 99 
EC-Israel Euro-Med Association 1995 99 
Norway-Estonia 1992 98 
Turkey-Czech Republic 1997 98 
Moldova-Albania 2003 98 
Slovakia-Turkey 1997 98 
Norway-Estonia 1992 97 
Macedonia-Romania 2003 97 
EFTA-Estonia 1995 97 
Lithuania-Slovakia 1996 97 
European Community-Czech Republic 1993 96 
Slovakia-Estonia 1996 96 
Norway-Lithuania 1992 96 
European Community-Latvia 1994 95 
EFTA-Latvia 1995 95 
European Community-Norway 1973 95 
Slovakia-Latvia 1996 95 
European Community-Lithuania 1995 94 
Macedonia-Romania 2003 94 
Slovenia-Slovakia 1993 94 
Czech Republic-Latvia 1996 94 
Turkmenistan-Armenia 1995 93 
European Community-Estonia 1995 93 
European Community-Serbia  2008 93 
Czech Republic-Slovenia 1993 91 
Latvia-Norway 1992 93 
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Major actors like the United States, European Union, and European Free Trade 
Agreement (EFTA) partners also figure prominently, as each is found in the top 10 of Table 3. 
Powerful economic actors should have a clear idea of what they want in trade agreements. They 
are likely to come to negotiations with a template, which we expect to be accepted largely intact 
by a weaker partner. Table 4, which complements the previous table by showing the “dyads,” or 
pairs, of PTAs that have the most overlapping contents, further affirms this is the case. For 
instance, we identify two U.S. agreements, with Peru and Colombia, which share 99% of the 
same text. Likewise, we observe three distinct pairings of PTAs that include European Union 
agreements on both sides, in which 95% of the text is replicated from one E.U. agreement to the 
other. The same is true for two sets of dyads that include EFTA members on both sides. In all of 
the above cases, the partner country is much smaller economically, which further indicates that 
the powerful-actor template is being reproduced with little alteration.  
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Table 4:  PTA Pairs with the Greatest Text Overlap  
 
PTA Year Matching PTA % Overlap 
Israel-Slovakia 1996 Israel-Czech Republic 99 
United States-Peru 2006 United States-Colombia 99 
Albania-Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003 Albania-Moldova 99 
EC-Israel Euro-Med Association 1995 EC-Israel  99 
Norway-Estonia 1992 Norway-Lithuania 98 
Turkey-Czech Republic 1997 Turkey-Slovakia 98 
Romania-Macedonia 2003 Romania-Albania 97 
EFTA-Latvia 1995 EFTA-Estonia 97 
Lithuania-Slovakia 1996 Lithuania-Czech Republic 97 
Slovakia-Latvia 1996 Slovakia-Lithuania 97 
EC-Czech Republic 1993 EC-Slovakia 96 
Norway-Latvia 1992 Norway-Lithuania 96 
Estonia-Slovakia 1996 Estonia-Czech Republic 96 
Norway-Lithuania 1992 Norway-Estonia  96 
EC-Latvia 1994 EC-Lithuania 95 
Slovakia-Latvia 1996 Slovakia-Lithuania 95 
EC-Norway 1973 EC-Switzerland-Lichtenstein 95 
EFTA-Latvia 1995 EFTA-Estonia 95 
Latvia-Czech Republic 1996 Latvia-Slovakia 94 
EC-Lithuania 1995 EC-Latvia 94 
EC-Norway 1973 EC-Iceland 94 
Romania-Macedonia 2003 Romania-Albania 94 
Slovenia-Slovakia 1993 Slovenia-Czech Republic 94 
Armenia-Turkmenistan 1995 Armenia-Moldova 93 
Estonia-Slovenia 1996 Estonia-Slovakia 93 
EC Serbia 2008 EC Montenegro 93 
EC Estonia 1995 EC-Latvia 93 
Latvia-Slovakia 1996 Czech Republic-Lithuania 93 
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The dominant pattern in Table 4, in fact, is that countries regularly copy-paste from their 
own past treaties. Table 4 lists all PTA pairings in which one agreement replicated 93% or more 
of the language from another agreement. In all cases but one, the source of that material is 
internal; that is, one of the current signatory’s past agreements. As discussed previously, in some 
cases this could be a power-play by an actor like the U.S. or E.U. to spread its preferred 
language. Norway’s heavily overlapping agreements with the Baltic states also fit this pattern in 
which a country with more leverage appears to be having its preferred template accepted by 
others in bilateral agreements.  
In other situations this recycling of one’s own past agreements may represent an 
unintentional first mover advantage that is bestowed simply by having an existing PTA. As noted 
earlier, many of the countries common to the pairings in Table 4 are post-Cold War transition 
countries. As many of them signed new trade agreements, they often leaned heavily on a 
previous treaty that one of them had signed recently. For instance, in Armenia’s agreement with 
Turkmenistan, the two of them borrowed heavily from Armenia’s agreement with Moldova from 
two years earlier. The same pattern is evidenced in Romania’s nearly-perfectly-overlapping 
treaties with Albania and then Macedonia. In cases like these, copy-pasting is likely borne of 
necessity and helped by having a recent treaty available.  
The above patterns constitute the tip of the iceberg; the 50 or so PTAs that are nearly-
perfectly copied from another source. Yet there are many other trade agreements that overlap in 
the range of 70-85%. Therefore, we emphasize two final dynamics that exist in these cases that 
lie just below the surface. Here we regularly see agreements in which the parties borrow heavily 
not from their own past PTAs, but from a country that is similar to either or both of the current 
signatories. This is most evident among the Baltic countries and countries in central Europe, 
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where we often see copy-pasting to the tune of 80% or more from the PTAs of one’s similar 
neighbors. We also see instances of this in the Middle East and Latin America. Another pattern 
we observe is that members of major plurilateral agreements tend to use the language from that 
agreement in future, typically bilateral, PTAs. For instance, the countries that signed the 1992 
Central European Free Trade Agreement later copied 60% or more of that agreement into dozens 
of PTAs they subsequently signed with other partners. Likewise, 86% of Canada’s 1996 
agreement with Chile can be traced back word-for-word to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which Canada had signed three years earlier.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this research we advance an emerging interdisciplinary narrative about how 
international treaty-making occurs through copy-pasting from existing templates. We identify 
dozens of situations in which more than 90% of a trade agreement is lifted verbatim from a pre-
existing agreement, which in our view is remarkable. Some will find the numbers we present to 
be startling; others will view them as unsurprising. Regardless of one’s perspective, we argue 
that our findings are noteworthy and have myriad implications.  
It now appears undeniable that many of the most-frequently studied international 
agreements are heavily copy-pasted. This reality needs to be acknowledged and incorporated into 
future efforts at theorizing and carrying out empirical analyses. These copy-paste dynamics 
appear to be highly applicable to trade and investment agreements, which we note continue to 
dominate the political and diplomatic landscape, as Brexit and the U.S. presidential election 
attest. But the ideas are applicable to the full range of international agreements, and 
computational advances make it easy for others to apply our methodology to additional topic-
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areas and other diplomatic endeavors. Our approach also adds a new dimension to ongoing 
attempts to study design variation within international institutions. We similarly assert that the 
international treaties on a particular issue can and do differ, but there often is much commonality 
among them, which we show to be copied-and-pasted.   
This reality of widespread copy-pasting has implications for international relations issues 
ranging from diffusion to power. There exists a vibrant literature in international relations on the 
diffusion of things like protests, democracy, and international agreements (e.g., Solingen 2012). 
Our unique contribution is to analyze the diffusion of language within the various agreements 
that are spreading globally. Moreover, we present an active diffusion story. Sometimes we 
observe pure emulation of others’ language, particularly by developing countries. At other times, 
however, powerful actors are the drivers of diffusion as they attempt to spread their preferred 
trade rules globally. Yet regardless of how language travels from one agreement to the next, it 
can have major consequences. Just look at the experiences of countries such as Bolivia, 
Indonesia, and even Australia, whose use of boilerplate investment treaty language on dispute 
settlement resulted in them being sued by foreign investors for billions of dollars, thus prompting 
a re-evaluation of how they specify their treaty commitments.   
  Several avenues are ripe for future research, including some that we have started down 
already. This research note provides important, case-based evidence to answer the obvious 
follow-up questions of “why” and “how” treaty language spreads. We expect that systematic 
regression-based investigations will uncover additional evidence of capacity-driven or power-
based copy-pasting, along with some new explanations. In general, we advocate exploring in 
much more detail the pathways by which language travels around the globe. Governments apply 
what they did in their own past treaties to future ones. Their new treaty partners also may 
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become part of additional chains. Thus we expect that the language in landmark agreements, 
such as NAFTA, early EU agreements, various WTO chapters, and perhaps the TPP, is more 
likely to be copied into future trade agreements. We also see the potential for exploring these 
links through network analysis. Although we expect all of these dynamics to be particularly 
applicable to PTAs and perhaps also BITs, we welcome efforts to apply them to other 
international institutions. Regardless of what a new treaty addresses and how it spreads, we 
expect that anyone who bothers to look at it carefully will see much that looks strikingly 
familiar.  
  
30 
 
References: 
 
Acharya, Amitav and Alastair Iain Johnston, eds. 2007. Crafting Cooperation: Regional 
Institutions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Allee, Todd and Manfred Elsig. 2015a. Dispute Settlement Provisions in PTAs:  New Data and 
New Concepts, in Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade 
Agreements, edited by A. Dür and M. Elsig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Allee, Todd and Manfred Elsig 2015b. Why Do Some International Institutions Contain Strong 
Dispute Settlement Provisions? New Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements. Review of 
International Organizations 11 (1): 89-120.   
 
Allee, Todd and Andrew Lugg. 2016a. Who Wrote the Rules for the Trans-Pacific Partnership?  
Research & Politics (July-September): 1-9.  
 
Allee, Todd and Andrew Lugg. 2016b. Do BITs Represent the Interests of Powerful States? 
Paper Presented at the 2016 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association. Atlanta, 
Georgia. 
 
Allee, Todd and Clint Peinhardt. 2012. “Contingent Credibility:  The Reputational Effects of 
Investment Treaty Disputes on Foreign Direct Investment.” International Organization 65(3):1-26. 
 
Allee Todd and Clint Peinhardt. 2014. “Evaluating Three Explanations for the Design of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties.” World Politics 66(1): 47-87.   
 
Alter, Karen. 2012. The Global Spread of European Style Courts. West European Politics 35 
(1):135-154. 
 
Alter, Karen and Sophie Meunier 2009. The Politics of International Regime Complexity. 
Perspectives on Politics 7 (1):13–24.  
 
Arnold, Christian and Berthold Rittberger. 2013. The Legalization of Dispute Resolution in 
Mercosur. Journal of Politics in Latin America 5 (3):97-132. 
 
Baccini, Leonardo and Andreas Dür. 2012. The New Regionalism and Policy Interdependence. 
British Journal of Political Science 42 (1):57-79. 
 
Baccini, Leonardo, Andreas Dür and Yoram Haftel. 2015. Imitation and Innovation in 
International Governance: The Diffusion of Trade Agreement Design. In Trade Cooperation: 
The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements, edited by A. Dür and M. 
Elsig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Ben-Sharar, Omri and James J. White. 2006. Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto 
Manufacturing Contracts. Michigan Law Review 104 (5):953-982. 
 
31 
 
Benvenisti, Eyal and George Downs. 2007. The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and 
the Frag-mentation of International Law. Stanford Law Review 60 (2):595–631. 
  
Berger, Axel, Matthias Busse, Peter Nunnenkamp & Martin Roy. 2010. Do Trade and 
Investment Agreements Lead to More FDI?  Accounting for Key Provisions Inside the Black 
Box.  Kiel Working Paper, No. 1647. 
 
Bernauer, Thomas, Anna Kalbhenn, Vally Koubi & Gabriele Spilker. 2013. Is There a ‘Depth 
Versus Participation’ Dilemma in International Cooperation? Review of International 
Organizations 8 (4):477-497. 
 
Berton, Peter, Hiroshi Kimura, and I. William Zartman, eds. International Negotiation: Actors, 
Structure/Process, Values. New York, St. Martin’s Press.  
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish 2008. Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements 
Undermine Free Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bloomfield, LA (2014) WCopyfind 4.1.4.  Available at:  
http://plagiarism.bloomfieldmedia.com/zwordpress/software/wcopyfind/ 
 
Börzel, Tanja and Thomas Risse. 2012. From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction. West 
European Politics 35 (1):1-19. 
 
Bradford, Anu and Tim Büthe. 2015. Competition Policy and Free Trade: Antitrust Provisions in 
PTAs. In Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade 
Agreements,” edited by A. Dür and M. Elsig, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Brown, Chester. 2013. Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Collins, Paul M., Pamela C. Corley, and Jesse Hanmer. 2013. The Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content. Paper presented at the 109th Annual Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association. Chicago, IL.  
 
Cooper, Andrew F., Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur. 2013. The Oxford Handbook of Modern 
Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Corley, Pamela C., Paul M. Collins, Jr., and Bryan Calvin. 2011. Lower Court Influence on U.S. 
Supreme Court Opinion Content. Journal of Politics 73 (1):31-44. 
 
Dolzer, Rudolf, and Christoph Schreuer. 2012. Principles of International Investment Law, 2nd 
ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Drezner, Daniel 2009. The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity. Perspectives on 
Politics 7(1): 65–70. 
 
32 
 
Dür, Andreas, Leonardo Baccini and Manfred Elsig. 2014. The Design of International Trade 
Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset. Review of International Organizations 9(3):353-375.  
 
Elkins, Zachary, Andrew Guzman, and Beth Simmons. 2006. “Competing for Capital: The 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000.” International Organization 60 (4):811-
46. 
Elsig, Manfred and Cédric Dupont. 2012. “European Union Meets South Korea: Bureaucratic 
Interests, Exporter Discrimination and the Negotiations of New Trade Agreements.” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 50(3):492-507. 
 
Elsig, Manfred and Omar Serrano. 2014. “Emerging Powers and Trade Remedy Laws: Design 
and Application.” Paper presented at the ISA's 55th Annual Convention, Toronto, Canada. 
 
Eshbaugh-Soha M. 2013. Presidential influence of the news media: the case of the press 
conference. Political Communication 30 (4):548-564. 
 
Estevadeordal, Antoni, Kati Suominen and Robert Teh, eds. 2009. Regional Rules in the Global 
Trading System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Fearon, James. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49 (3):379-414. 
 
Feldman, Adam.  A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court Opinion Language.” Available at: 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2574451 
 
Fink, Carsten and Martin Molinuevo. 2008. East Asian Preferential Trade Agreements in 
Services: Liberalization Content and WTO Rules. World Trade Review 7 (4):641-673. 
 
Gilligan, Michael J. and Leslie Johns. 2012. Format Models of International Institutions.  
Annual Review of Political Science 15: 221-243.  
 
Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000. Introduction: 
Legalization and World Politics. International Organization 54 (3):385-99 
 
Grimmer, Justin and Brandon M. Stewart. 2013. Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts. Political Analysis 21 (3):267-297. 
 
Gulati, Mitu and Robert E. Scott. 2012. The Three and a Half Minute Transaction: Boilerplate 
and the Limits of Contract Design. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Haftel, Yoram. 2012. Regional Economic Institutions and Conflict Mitigation. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press.  
 
Jetschke, Anja and Tobias Lenz. 2013. Does Regionalism Diffuse? A New Research Agenda for 
the Study of Regional Organizations. Journal of European Public Policy 20 (4):626-637. 
 
33 
 
Jetschke, Anja and Philomena Murray. 2012. Diffusing Regional Integration: the EU and 
Southeast Asia. West European Politics 35 (1):174-191. 
 
Jo, Hyeran and Hyun Namgung. 2012. Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Preferential Trade  
Agreements:  Democracy, Boilerplates, and the Multilateral Trade Regime. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 56 (6):1041-68. 
 
Kahan, Marcel and Michael Klausner. 1997. Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (Or, the ‘Economics of Boilerplate’). Virginia Law Review 83 (4):713-770. 
 
Koremenos, Barbara. 2013. The Continent of International Law. Journal of Conflict Resolution 
57 (4):653-681. 
 
Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The Rational Design of 
International Institutions.  International Organization 55(4):761-799. 
 
Kucik, Jeffrey. 2012. The Domestic Politics of Institutional Design: Producer Preferences 
over Trade Agreement Rules. Economics & Politics 24 (2):95-118. 
 
Lenz, Tobias. 2012. Spurred Emulation: the EU and Regional Integration in Mercosur and 
SADC. West European Politics 35 (1):155-173. 
 
Milewicz, Karolina, James Hollway, Claire Peacock and Duncan Snidal. 2014. Beyond Trade: 
How Powerful States Use PTAs to Leverage Non-Trade Objectives. Paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC. 
 
Neumayer, Eric, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Martin Roy. 2014. Are Stricter Investment Rules 
Contagious? Host Country Competition for Foreign Direct Investment Through International 
Agreements. Kiel Working Paper, No. 1910. 
 
Ofodile, Uche Ewelukwa. 2013. Africa-China Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Critique. 
Michigan Journal of International Law 35 (1):131-211.  
 
Pauwelyn, Joost 2003. Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law relates to 
Other Rules of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Poulsen, Lauge N. Skovgaard.  2015. Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy: The 
Politics of Investment Treaties in Developing Countries. Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Poulsen, Lauge N. Skovgaard. 2014. Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of Modern 
Investment Treaties. International Studies Quarterly 58 (1):1-14. 
 
Radin, Margaret J. 2013. Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law. 
Princeton:  Princeton University Press.  
 
34 
 
Rühl, Johannes. 2012. Which Model Diffuses? Designing the Mercosur Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism. Manuscript, Graduate Institute of International and Development 
Studies, Geneva. 
 
Smith, James McCall. 2000. The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design. International 
Organization 54 (1):137-180. 
 
Solingen, Etel. 2012. Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global Politics 
of International Diffusion. International Studies Quarterly 56 (4):631-644. 
 
Spirling, Arthur. 2012. US treaty-making with American Indians. American Journal of Political 
Science 56 (1):84-97. 
 
Starkey, Brigid, Mark A. Boyer, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2005. Negotiating a Complex World: 
An Introduction to International Negotiation. Lanham, MD:  Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
Tallberg, Jonas., Thomas Sommerer, and Theresa Squatrito. 2015. Democratic Membership in 
International Organizations: Sources of Institutional Design. Review of International 
Organizations.   
 
UNCTAD. 2015. World Investment Report 2015:  Reforming International Investment 
Governance. Geneva: United Nations. 
 
Vandevelde, Kenneth J. 1992. United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice. 
Cambridge: Kluwer Law International. 
  
 
 
  
35 
 
Appendix:  Examples of Matching Text between PTAs 
 
 
Red = Matching Text   
Black = Unmatched Text 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Comparison of Armenia-Turkmenistan (1995) and Armenia-Moldova (1993) 
 
Armenia-Turkmenistan 
 
Article 10 
 
This Agreement shall not impede the right of any of 
the Contracting Parties to take generally accepted in 
the international practice measures which it 
considers necessary for protecting its vital interests 
or which are undoubtedly necessary for compliance 
with international agreements to which it is or 
intends to become a party, if these measures relate 
to: 
 
- information affecting the interests of national 
defence, trade in arms, munitions and military 
equipment; 
 
- research or production related to the defence 
needs; 
 
- supply of materials and equipment used in nuclear 
industry; 
 
- protection of public morality and public order; 
 
- protection of industrial and intellectual property; 
 
- gold, silver, and other precious metals and stones; 
 
- protection of human, animal and plant life. 
 
Article 11 
 
With the goal of pursuing coordinated policy of 
export control in relation to the third countries 
Contracting Parties shall conduct regular 
consultations and take mutually agreed measures 
for creation of effective system of export control. 
 
 
 
Armenia-Moldova 
 
Article 11 
 
This Agreement shall not impede the right of any of 
the Contracting Parties to take generally accepted in 
the international practice measures which it 
considers necessary for protecting its vital interests 
or which are undoubtedly necessary for compliance 
with international agreements to which it is or 
intends to become a party, if these measures relate 
to: 
 
- information affecting the interests of national 
defence; 
 
- trade in arms, munitions and military equipment; 
 
- research or production related to the defence 
needs; 
 
- supply of materials and equipment used in nuclear 
industry; 
 
- protection of public morality and public order; 
 
- protection of industrial and intellectual property; 
 
- gold, silver, and other precious metals and stones; 
 
- protection of human, animal and plant life. 
 
Article 12 
 
With the goal of pursuing coordinated policy of 
export control in relation to the third countries 
Contracting Parties shall conduct regular 
consultations and take mutually agreed measures 
for creation of effective system of export control. 
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Article 14 
 
Disputes between Contracting Parties 
related to interpretation or application of 
provisions of this Agreement shall be resolved by 
means of negotiations. 
 
Contracting Parties shall endeavour to 
avoid conflicting situations in mutual trade. 
 
Contracting Parties establish that claims 
and disputes between economic entities of both 
countries resulting from interpretation or 
implementation of commercial contracts or 
transactions, in case they cannot be settled 
amicably on the basis of consultations and 
negotiations and unless agreed otherwise, will be 
the exclusive competence of arbitration tribunals 
(permanent or ad hoc) established in the territory 
of Contracting Parties or the territory of the third 
states specified by the Parties having signed the 
contract. 
 
The latter can also define the applicable 
substantive law, norms and procedures as well as 
the premises for the hearing of the case. 
 
Each Contracting Party shall assure in its 
territory effective means to recognise and enforce 
arbitration awards. 
 
Article 15 
 
 Disputes between Contracting Parties 
related to interpretation or application of   
provisions of this Agreement shall be resolved by 
means of negotiations. 
 
 Contracting Parties shall endeavour to 
avoid conflicting situations in mutual trade. 
 
 Contracting Parties establish that claims 
and disputes between economic entities of both 
countries resulting from interpretation or 
implementation of commercial contracts or 
transactions, in case they cannot be settled  
amicably on the basis of consultations and 
negotiations and unless agreed otherwise, will be 
the exclusive competence of arbitration tribunals 
(permanent or ad hoc) established in the territory  
of Contracting Parties or the territory of the third 
states specified by the Parties having signed the 
contract. 
 
 The latter can also define the applicable 
substantive law, norms and procedures as well as 
the premises for the hearing of the case. 
 
 Each Contracting Party shall assure in its 
territory effective means to recognise and enforce 
arbitration awards. 
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2) Comparison of US-Colombia (2006) and US-Chile (2003) 
 
 
United States-Colombia 
 
Article 2.5: Temporary Admission of Goods 
 
1. Each Party shall grant duty-free temporary 
admission for the following goods, regardless of 
their origin: 
 
(a) professional equipment, including 
equipment for the press or television, software, and 
broadcasting and cinematographic equipment, 
necessary for carrying out the business activity, 
trade, or profession of a person who qualifies for 
temporary entry pursuant to the laws of the 
importing Party; 
 
(b) goods intended for display or 
demonstration; 
 
(c) commercial samples and advertising films 
and recordings; and 
 
(d) goods admitted for sports purposes. 
  
2. Each Party shall, at the request of the 
person concerned and for reasons its customs 
authority considers valid, extend the time limit for 
temporary admission beyond the period initially 
fixed. 
 
3. No Party may condition the duty-free 
temporary admission of a good referred to in 
paragraph 1, other than to require that the good: 
 
(a) be used solely by or under the personal 
supervision of a national or resident of another Party 
in the exercise of the business activity, trade, 
profession, or sport of that person; 
 
(b) not be sold or leased while in its territory; 
 
(c) be accompanied by a security in an 
amount no greater than the charges that would 
otherwise be owed on entry or final importation, 
releasable on exportation of the good; 
 
(d) be capable of identification when 
exported; 
 
 
United States-Chile 
 
Article 3.7: Temporary Admission of Goods 
 
1. Each Party shall grant duty-free temporary 
admission for: 
  
(a) professional equipment, including 
equipment for the press or television, software and 
broadcasting and cinematographic equipment, 
necessary for carrying out the business activity, 
trade or profession of a business person who 
qualifies for temporary entry pursuant to the laws of 
the importing Party; 
 
(b) goods intended for display or 
demonstration; 
 
(c) commercial samples and advertising films 
and recordings; and 
 
(d) goods admitted for sports purposes, 
regardless of their origin. 
 
2. Each Party shall, at the request of the 
person concerned and for reasons deemed valid by 
its customs authority, extend the time limit for 
temporary admission beyond the period initially 
fixed. 
 
3. Neither Party may condition the duty-free 
temporary admission of goods referred to in 
paragraph 1, other than to require that such goods: 
 
(a) be used solely by or under the personal 
supervision of a national or resident of the other 
Party in the exercise of the business activity, trade, 
profession, or sport of that person; 
 
(b) not be sold or leased while in its territory; 
 
(c) be accompanied by a security in an 
amount no greater than the charges that would 
otherwise be owed on entry or final importation, 
releasable on exportation of the good; 
 
(d) be capable of identification when 
exported; 
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(e) be exported on the departure of the 
person referenced in subparagraph (a), or within 
such other period related to the purpose of the 
temporary admission as the Party may establish, or 
within one year, unless extended; 
 
(f) be admitted in no greater quantity than is 
reasonable for its intended use; and 
 
(g) be otherwise admissible into the Party’s 
territory under its law. 
 
4. If any condition that a Party imposes under 
paragraph 3 has not been fulfilled, the Party may 
apply the customs duty and any other charge that 
would normally be owed on the good plus any other 
charges or penalties provided for under its law. 
 
5. Each Party shall adopt and maintain 
procedures providing for the expeditious release of 
goods admitted under this Article. To the extent 
possible, such procedures shall provide that when 
such a good accompanies a national or resident of 
the other Party who is seeking temporary entry, the 
good shall be released simultaneously with the entry 
of that national or resident. 
 
6. Each Party shall permit a good temporarily 
admitted under this Article to be exported through a 
customs port other than that through which it was 
admitted. 
 
7. Each Party shall provide that the importer 
or other person responsible for a good admitted 
under this Article shall not be liable for failure to 
export the good on presentation of satisfactory 
proof to the importing Party that the good has been 
destroyed within the original period fixed for 
temporary admission or any lawful extension. 
 
8. Subject to Chapters Ten (Investment) and 
Eleven (Cross-Border Trade in Services): 
 
(a) each Party shall allow a vehicle or 
container used in international traffic that enters its 
territory from the territory of another Party to exit 
its territory on any route that is reasonably related 
to the economic and prompt departure of such 
vehicle or container; 
 
 
 
 
(e) be exported on the departure of the 
person referenced in subparagraph (a), or within 
such other period, related to the purpose of the 
temporary admission, as the Party may establish, or 
within one year, unless extended; 
 
(f) be admitted in no greater quantity than is 
reasonable for their intended use; and 
 
(g) be otherwise admissible into the Party’s 
territory under its laws. 
 
4. If any condition that a Party imposes under 
paragraph 3 has not been fulfilled, the Party may 
apply the customs duty and any other charge that 
would normally be owed on the good plus any other 
charges or penalities provided for under its domestic 
law. 
 
5. Each Party, through its customs authority, 
shall adopt procedures providing for the expeditious 
release of goods admitted under this Article.  To the 
extent possible, such procedures shall provide that 
when such a good accompanies a national or 
resident of the other Party who is seeking temporary 
entry, the good shall be released simultaneously 
with the entry of that national or resident. 
 
6. Each Party shall permit a good temporarily 
admitted under this Article to be exported through a 
customs port other than that through which it was 
admitted. 
 
7. Each Party, through its customs authority, 
consistent with domestic law, shall relieve the 
importer or other person responsible for a good 
admitted under this Article from any liability for 
failure to export the good on presentation of 
satisfactory proof to customs authorities that the 
good has been destroyed within the original period 
fixed for temporary admission or any lawful 
extension. 
 
8. Subject to Chapters Ten (Investment) and 
Eleven (Cross-Border Trade in Services): 
 
(a) each Party shall allow a vehicle or 
container used in international traffic that enters its 
territory from the territory of the other Party to exit 
its territory on any route that is reasonably related 
to the economic and prompt departure of such 
vehicle or container; 
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(b) no Party may require any security or 
impose any penalty or charge solely by reason of any 
difference between the port of entry and the port of 
departure of a vehicle or container; 
 
(c) no Party may condition the release of any 
obligation, including any security, that it imposes in 
respect of the entry of a vehicle or container into its 
territory on its exit through any particular port of 
departure; and 
 
(d) no Party may require that the vehicle or 
carrier bringing a container from the territory of 
another Party into its territory be the same vehicle 
or carrier that takes the container to the territory of 
another Party. 
 
9. For purposes of paragraph 8, vehicle 
means a truck, a truck tractor, a tractor, a trailer unit 
or trailer, a locomotive, or a railway car or other 
railroad equipment. 
 
 
Article 2.10:  Administrative Fees and Formalities 
 
1. Each Party shall ensure, in accordance with 
Article VIII:1 of the GATT 1994 and its interpretive 
notes, that all fees and charges of whatever 
character (other than customs duties, charges 
equivalent to an internal tax or other internal  
charge applied consistently with Article III:2 of the 
GATT 1994, and antidumping and countervailing 
duties) imposed on or in connection with 
importation or exportation are limited in amount to 
the approximate cost of services rendered and do 
not represent an indirect protection to domestic 
goods or a taxation of imports or exports for fiscal 
purposes. 
 
2. No Party may require consular 
transactions, including related fees and charges, in 
connection with the importation of any good of 
another Party. 
 
3. Each Party shall make available and 
maintain through the Internet a current list of the 
fees and charges it imposes in connection with 
importation or exportation. 
 
4. The United States shall eliminate its 
Merchandise Processing Fee on originating goods of 
Colombia upon the entry into force of this 
Agreement. 
(b) neither Party may require any bond or 
impose any penalty or charge solely by reason of any 
difference between the port of entry and the port of 
departure of a vehicle or container; 
 
(c) neither Party may condition the release of 
any obligation, including any bond, that it imposes in 
respect of the entry of a vehicle or container into its 
territory on its exit through any particular port of 
departure; and 
 
(d) neither Party may require that the vehicle 
or carrier bringing a container from the territory of 
the other Party into its territory be the same vehicle 
or carrier that takes such container to the territory 
of the other Party. 
 
9. For purposes of paragraph 8, vehicle 
means a truck, a truck tractor, tractor, trailer unit   
or trailer, a locomotive, or a railway car or other 
railroad equipment. 
 
 
Article 3.12:  Administrative Fees and Formalities 
 
1. Each Party shall ensure, in accordance with 
Article VIII:1 of GATT 1994 and its interpretive  
notes, that all fees and charges of whatever 
character (other than customs duties, charges 
equivalent to an internal tax or other internal 
charge applied consistently with Article III:2 of GATT 
1994, and antidumping and countervailing duties) 
imposed on or in connection with importation or 
exportation are limited in amount to the 
approximate cost of services rendered and do not 
represent an indirect protection to domestic goods 
or a taxation of imports or exports for fiscal 
purposes. 
 
2. Neither Party may require consular 
transactions, including related fees and charges, in 
connection with the importation of any good of the 
other Party. 
 
3. Each Party shall make available through 
the Internet or a comparable computer- based 
telecommunications network a current list of the 
fees and charges it imposes in connection with 
importation or exportation. 
 
4. The United States shall eliminate its 
merchandise processing fee on originating goods of 
Chile. 
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Article 2.12:  Distinctive Products 
 
1. Colombia shall recognize Bourbon Whiskey 
and Tennessee Whiskey, which is a straight Bourbon 
Whiskey authorized to be produced only in the State 
of Tennessee, as distinctive products of the United 
States. Accordingly, Colombia shall not permit the 
sale of any product as Bourbon Whiskey or 
Tennessee Whiskey, unless it has been 
manufactured in the United States in accordance 
with the laws and regulations of the United States 
governing the manufacture of Bourbon Whiskey and 
Tennessee Whiskey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 3.15:  Distinctive Products 
 
1. Chile shall recognize Bourbon Whiskey  
and Tennessee Whiskey, which is a straight Bourbon 
Whisky authorized to be produced only in the State 
of Tennessee, as distinctive products of the United 
States.  Accordingly, Chile shall not permit the sale  
of any product as Bourbon Whiskey or Tennessee 
Whiskey, unless it has been manufactured in the 
United States in accordance with the laws and 
regulations of the United States governing the 
manufacture of Bourbon Whiskey and Tennessee 
Whiskey. 
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3) Comparison of European Communities-Montenegro (2007) and European Communities-
Albania (2006)    
 
  
EC-Montenegro 
 
ARTICLE 7 
 
The Parties reaffirm the importance that they attach 
to the fight against terrorism and the 
implementation of international obligations in this 
area. 
 
ARTICLE 15 
 
Cooperation with other countries having signed a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
 
After the signature of this Agreement, Montenegro 
shall start negotiations with the countries which 
have already signed a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with a view to concluding bilateral 
conventions on regional cooperation, the aim of 
which shall be to enhance the scope of cooperation 
between the countries concerned. 
 
The main elements of these conventions shall be: 
 
(a) political dialogue; 
 
(b) the establishment of free trade areas, 
consistent with relevant WTO provisions; 
 
(c) mutual concessions concerning the 
movement of workers, establishment, supply of 
services, current payments and movement of capital 
as well as other policies related to movement of 
persons at an equivalent level to that of this 
Agreement; 
 
(d) provisions on cooperation in other fields 
whether or not covered by this Agreement, and 
notably the field of Justice, Freedom and Security. 
 
These conventions shall contain provisions for the 
creation of the necessary institutional mechanisms, 
as appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EC-Albania  
 
ARTICLE 5 
 
The Parties reaffirm the importance that they attach 
to the fight against terrorism and the 
implementation of international obligations in this 
area. 
 
ARTICLE 13 
 
Cooperation with other countries having signed a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
 
After the signature of this Agreement, Albania shall 
start negotiations with the countries which have 
already signed a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with a view to concluding bilateral 
Conventions on regional cooperation, the aim of 
which shall be to enhance the scope of cooperation 
between the countries concerned. 
 
The main elements of these conventions shall be: 
 
– political dialogue; 
 
– the establishment of a free trade area 
between the Parties, consistent with the relevant 
WTO provisions; 
 
– mutual concessions concerning the 
movement of workers, establishment, supply of 
services, current payments and movement of capital 
as well as other policies related to movement of 
persons at an equivalent level to that of this 
Agreement; 
 
– provisions on cooperation in other fields 
whether or not covered by this Agreement, and 
notably the field of Justice and Home Affairs. 
 
These Conventions shall contain provisions for the 
creation of the necessary institutional mechanisms, 
as appropriate. 
 
 
 4) Comparison of US-Panama (2007) and US-Colombia (2006)   
 
 
United States-Panama 
 
Article 3.18:  Sugar Compensation Mechanism 
 
1. In any year, the United States may, at its 
option, apply a mechanism that results in 
compensation to Panama’s exporters of sugar goods 
in lieu of according duty-free treatment to some or 
all of the duty-free quantities of sugar goods 
established for Panama in paragraph 6 of Appendix I 
to the General Notes of the Schedule of the United 
States to Annex 3.3. Such compensation shall be 
equivalent to the estimated economic rents that 
Panama’s exporters would have obtained on exports 
to the United States of any such amounts of sugar 
goods and shall be provided within 30 days after the 
United States exercises this option. The United States 
shall notify Panama at least 90 days before it 
exercises this option and, on request, shall enter into 
consultations with Panama regarding application of 
the mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States-Colombia 
 
Article 2.19:  Sugar Compensation Mechanism 
 
1. In any year, the United States may, at its 
option, apply a mechanism that results in 
compensation to a Party’s exporters of sugar goods 
in lieu of according duty-free treatment to some or 
all of the duty-free quantity of sugar goods 
established for that Party in Appendix I to the 
Schedule of the United States to Annex 2.3. Such 
compensation shall be equivalent to the estimated 
economic rents the Party’s exporters would have 
obtained on exports to the United States of any such 
amounts of sugar goods and shall be provided within 
30 days after the United States exercises this option. 
The United States shall notify the Party at least 90 
days before it exercises this option and, on request, 
shall enter into consultations with the Party 
regarding application of the mechanism. 
 
